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1. Introductory note. Something to remember. 
Some time ago, Bertrand Russell firstly and Karl Popper later on, re-
flected upon problems regarding knowledge. Particularly, about the 
practical consequences that can arise from the adoption of certain 
epistemology, not only for the scientific activity itself, but also for 
ethics and politics1. Popper explains how a wrong epistemological 
theory can produce such effects and provide two examples: (i) the 
first one refers to what he calls epistemological optimism, based on 
the idea that the truth is obvious, this is a belief that, despite having 
accompanied the birth of modern science and technology and con-
tributed to the freedom of thought2, dispenses with the fact that it is 
often difficult to get to the truth, and once it is found it could be lost 
again easily, because of that Popper attributes to this belief to have 
1  Karl Popper, The development of scientific knowledge – conjectures and refutations 
-, Paidos, 1967, p. 11 et seq. Retelling of a Popper’s conference delivered on January in 
1960, which expresses this coincidence with Russel on this point, remembers that the 
latter had said, for example, that ‘epistemological relativism’, or the idea that there is not 
an objective truth, and ‘epistemological pragmatism’, id est the idea that truth and useful-
ness are the same thing, are both closely linked authoritarian and totalitarian ideas (from 
Russell in Let the people think, 1941). On the same issue it could see, among others: b. 
Russell, Unpopular essays (1950), Hermes, 2nd ed. In Spanish 1963, and K. Popper, The 
open society and its enemies (1945, 1966), Paidos, 1992.
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provoked disappointments that led to sceptical attitudes3 and also 
caused several forms of bigotry4; (ii) on the opposite side Popper 
mentions scepticism or epistemological pessimism, which is born 
from a contrary idea, equally wrong, consisted in a radical distrust 
of the power of human reason to discern truth, and it is also pro-
ne to fall in an “absolute authority”, which establishes “truth” and 
proclaims it. In one way or another, such approaches have inspired 
authoritarian conceptions, and have twisted the right way of scien-
tific research as well5.
In the context described, as introductory note to what will be said 
lately, I have found relevant to refer to certain Popper’s observations 
on the epistemological scepticism. He says that the belief in the pos-
sibility of a rule of law, of an equitable justice, the establishment of 
fundamental rights and a free society, can survive to the recognition 
that the judges are not omniscient and can make mistakes about the 
facts, and that, in practice, absolute justice is never done in a par-
ticular trial. But this belief in the possibility of a rule of law, justice 
and freedom, cannot survive the acceptance of an epistemology for 
which there are no “objective facts”, not only in a particular case, 
but in any case, and for which a judge can not commit a factual er-
ror because, in terms of facts, he cannot be right or wrong6.
3 Popper says that many disillusioned epistemologists would break their own previous 
optimism and build an authoritarian theory on the basis of a pessimistic epistemology, 
and he thought that the greatest of the epistemologists, Plato, exemplifies this tragic 
evolution (op. cit., p. 16).
4  Because if, either by divine revelation or by simple reading of nature, the truth is evi-
dent, how could anyone refuse to recognize it? Only either acting with malice or being a 
victim of a conspiracy to plunge him ignorance of this obvious truth. Popper points out 
how conspiracy theories influenced in religious persecutions, the Marxist conception 
(when it accuses the ‘capitalist press that it perverts and suppresses the truth’), and the 
remaining authoritarian doctrines (op. cit., p. 14-15). 
5  The eminent Austrian epistemologist, from his own experience, notes that in the search 
for the truth, the best plan could be: begin with the criticism of our strongest beliefs (op. 
cit., p. 13).
6  Op. cit., chap. II, p. 11.
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In light of the remembrance of these reflections, as I suggested in a 
recent symposium7, I will examine some issues which, in the same 
way, may arise in the field of the theory of law. To do that, I will be 
focusing on certain tenets of the so-called ‘critical legal theory’, 
from the formulation of one of its most prominent exponents, Dun-
can Kennedy8. I will analyze these proposals and give a brief outline 
of a different perspective. I will begin with a summary of this thesis 
(2), to later on point out objections that I find in its formulation, 
from the point of view of their logical coherence (3) and its practical 
consequences (4).
2. The interpreter faces the according to Duncan Kennedy. 
Nothing is what it seems [Now you see me].
In a nutshell, according to the opinion of the aforementioned au-
thor, judges -and lawyers-, in their role as interpreters of the law, are 
immersed in a context dominated by ideologies which affect their 
judgments about the solutions that will be drawn from the legal 
order for individual cases that have to be resolved9. He noted that 
while they attempt to show the legal necessity of their solutions 
regardless of ideology, in fact they cannot get rid of strategic beha-
vior, that is, the choice of one of the possible solutions of the legal 
problem, based on external reasons, basically on their ideological 
preference. Kennedy considers that this circumstance is ineradi-
7  Held in the School of Law of the Buenos Aires’ University, from 5 to 7 May 2014, it had 
large attendance and dealt with different issues about philosophy of law, under the theme 
Rationality in Law. 
8  Four studies of this author have been published under the title ‘Left and right’. I will fo-
cus my attention on the first one, dealing with strategic behavior in legal interpretation, 
and the second:  a left phenomenological alternative to the Hart and Kelsen legal inter-
pretation theory. These studies, found in the Critical Legal Studies (CLS), are preceded 
by a good introduction by translator, Guillermo Moro, ed. Siglo XXI, 2013. 
9 Kennedy’s reflections are essentially concerned with American judges. That’s what he 
announces at the beginning (p. 27) and other passages of his book (v. gr. p. 36, 95). In 
his presentation he defined ideology as an universalization project from an intelligen-
tsia that considers itself acting ‘for’ a group whose interests are in conflict with those 
of other groups (sic, p. 28, see also quote from Mannhein, p. 95). It is a wide meaning 
apparently, although less clear, and the only examples mentioned are liberalism and 
conservatism, in the sense that he attributes to these trends in American society, warning 
that, above their differences, both assume a general structure and similar argumentative 
elements, which only differs in its presentation.
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cable of interpretation10, an adjective that anticipates his vision of 
the problem. It is always possible for the judge -he says- to adopt 
a strategic attitude toward materials [he refers to the rules], to try 
to make them mean something different from what they seemed at 
fist, or to give then one meaning which excludes other initially pos-
sible11. That is why he says that judges are ideological actors, even 
irrespective of their own perception, that is, know it or not.
In another passage Kennedy seems to mitigate the rigour of the dis-
course and  tries to take distance from a more radical view in terms 
of the presence of ideology in the Court’s decision. He expresses 
that, from his point of view, the insistence that the law is always and 
everywhere ideological, that it is a social construction from begin-
ning to end, etc., involves as much denial as the opposite position. 
And he adds that his theory is so hostile to global criticisms of ob-
jectivity in law, whether they are made from old Marxist angle or 
the postmodern one, as to the claim that the judges can always be 
and in fact usually ‘neutral’12. However, in the second study, by 
dealing with approaches by Hart and Kelsen on the interpretation 
of law, he restarts putting in the middle of the scene the activity of 
the interpreter (judge or lawyer). He insists that they not only ma-
nipulates the normative material to build the solution of the Hart’s 
penumbral zone, or within the Kelsen’s framework, but also in the 
previous step, to decides if it is possible to fit the case or not in that 
area, or if there is or not a matter of conflict, a gap, etc.
Inspired by a Marx’s work, Kennedy insists now that the interpreter 
carriers out a legal “work” to transform what would be called ini-
tial apprehension of the solution given by rules, in order to adapt 
it to his ideological preference. Id est that the CLS (Critical Legal 
10  Kennedy, p. 28.
11  Op. cit., p. 32. The judges thus resemble wizards who play with who play imagination 
of the audience, as in the film by Louis Leterrier (‘Now you see me’ or ‘Nothing is what it 
seems’, 2013), creating mere plot appearances for their decisions, which would not have, 
however, real connection with the legal basis to which they relate.
12 Op. cit., p. 63.
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Studies) as he understands them13, accept the positivist idea that 
the law is sometimes determinate and some times indetermina-
te, but they claim that this is not inherent in the qualities norms, 
on the contrary it depends on the work of the interpreter and its 
strategic success, as a consequence of the unknowable nature ‘in 
itself ’ or ‘essential’ of the norm (sic)14. Developing this perspective 
in contrast to the Hart’s and Kelsen’s position, he noted then that 
even when an interpretation is established, the work can destabilize 
it, i.e. the work can tilt or move nuclei and frames, in a bottom to 
top fashion opposite to the authors’ views above mentioned and 
MacKormick too.
To complete the idea he adds that ideology slants work, which in 
turn slants nuclei and frames, which in turn, in the perspective of 
coherence, provide the means to produce other destabilization of 
other nuclei and frames. With this perspective, the corpus of va-
lid law, is presented as the historical product of lawyers’, jurists’ 
and judges’ works, who carriers out opposing ideological projects. 
What is more that corpus is unpredictably subject to destabilization 
by future working strategies with an ideological orientation15. Legal 
equipment only influences the outcome of particular cases in com-
bination with an interpretive activity is not cognitive but consciously 
or unconsciously strategic, although inherently considered its “es-
sence” is “unknowable”16.
There is a moment in which Kennedy’s explanation changes focus. 
When the expert on judicial activity, concerned with presenting a 
tightly descriptive analysis of such activity, gives way to the com-
mitted intellectual who expresses his own ‘ideological preference’, 
by praising the activist judge’s performance, who consciously or 
unconsciously pursues his own ideological commitments, opposite 
to those who seek their neutrality tacking unpredictable or centrist 
13  In other paragraphs it says that he adheres to what he calls a phenomenological CLS 
left tendency (pp. 94, 100).
14  Op. cit., pp. 90-93; the same idea is then repeated at pp. 100 and 101.
15 Op. cit., pp. 98, 99.
16  Idem, pp. 100, 101.
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positions17. Kennedy considers legitimate the attitude of the first 
one, and adds that if the activist can’t destabilize the rule by using 
conventional techniques, he has to find the argument so that the so-
lution matches to his conception of Justice. Our author admits that 
his stance the difficulty of an infinite regression to know whether 
the destabilization occurred or not because of conventional techni-
ques, but still prefers it to the others alternatives.
3. Objections from the point of view.
Perhaps the most remarkable feature in Duncan Kennedy’s study, 
of which a quick view has been given, consists of having designed a 
legal sociology, and in particular a judiciary sociology, which inves-
tigates haw judges’ behave in their mission to create solutions for 
cases they have to decide. He proposes a typology of that behavior18, 
but he also indicates how he believes that they should act. I will le-
ave out here other aspects involved in this interesting contribution, 
to concentrate on the question linked to the impossibility of an ob-
jective formulation about solutions coming from a legal order, and 
its virtual neutrality.
Through a speech that sometimes becomes unclear and still unste-
ady, although Kennedy seems to give something to positivism when 
he refers to a relative determination of the law, it is only in appearan-
ce. As we have seen, ultimately he insists on a ‘critical’ questioning 
and the potentially destabilizing role which allows the interpreter 
to remove normative material from its original sense with the stra-
tegic work. Thus, that material becomes inherently unknowable.
If we follow that line of argument, it is practically impossible to 
achieve an objective knowledge of the law. Because in any interpre-
tation the interpreter’s ideological orientation shall always prevail 
17  Idem, pp. 95, 96. He attributes these ideas to judges who establish their ideological 
neutrality in two ways: alternating unpredictably between defined by ideologies in con-
flict, or coming up with a solution that gives something to each side.
18  According to the way of their response on the basis of ideological preference, he men-
tions three types of judges: activist, mediator and bipolar; but as a common feature he 
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above the conclusions which could be drawn from the normative 
material. The normative propositions that attempt to describe the 
content of the rules could not be, in fact, susceptible of truth or 
falsehood. For the simple reason that it would not be possible to 
verify them, precisely because the interpreter’s conditions hinder 
objectives judgments in this regard. And the ones which appear as 
such judgments would be, at best, a mask to hide ideology that 
is behind. The argument leads, therefore, to discard a priori the 
possibility of acquiring objective knowledge in all imaginable legal 
orders, either with purely theoretical purposes, or as a preliminary 
step in its application by the courts.
I find a paradoxical twist in the foundations of this thesis. To give 
compelling reasons in its favor, supporters have necessarily to start 
from that what they themselves consider a reliable version of the con-
tents of the legal order. That is to say an ‘objective knowledge’ and a 
‘neutral interpretation of its rules’. Otherwise it would not be possi-
ble to assert that certain interpretations or any “work” that is attemp-
ted would produce a sort of ideological degradation of that order.
Only if an objective sense of norms which makes up this order is 
assumed, it is possible to speak of a distortion or inclined intelli-
gence by the ideological preference of the interpreter. Because in 
Kennedy’s opinion the indetermination of law does not concern 
with intrinsic barriers, id est obstacles caused by logical problems 
of inconsistency or incompleteness of the legal order, or seman-
tic difficulties in comprehension of texts. Realism has highlighted 
these last difficulties and the open texture of normative language. 
It suggests the possibility of attributing different meanings to cer-
tain texts, situation which would lead to several alternative solu-
tions, phenomena with different opinions about its consequences. 
But the theory we are talking about, beyond of semantic or logical 
problems, emphasizes the incidence of ideology, an extrinsic factor 
of the content of norms. And it does it in such a way that ideology 
becomes a decisive and uncontrollable factor.
Of course, beliefs, political opinions, points of view on multiple as-
pects of life, the temperamental inclinations and so on, are part 
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of judges’ subjectivity (and legal systems operators as well), which 
affect what they do, and part of what they do is to resolve cases 
through the application of system rules. But this does not mean that 
it is not possible to obtain an objective knowledge of them provide 
normative solutions for such cases.
Moreover, if we start from the hypothesis that a particular extrinsic 
factor, in this case ideology, it prevails decisively in the understanding 
of the rules, the only rational alternative to support it lies in presu-
pposing an objective sense of rules, which shall be considered ‘true’ 
or ‘reliable’, to be able to contrast it with other interpretations which, 
according to criticism, would be influenced by ideology. This para-
dox is hinted in Kennedy’s argument when he admits an initial sense 
which is offered to the interpreter in a first understanding of applica-
ble rules, preceding his destabilizing work. Also, when he attributes 
that work the indetermination of the normative material.
The observation is not irrelevant and reveals that in the thesis under 
analysis two different areas appear to be confusing: one that descri-
bes the interpretative activity of norms, with particular reference to 
what the judges do, and another not so obvious that tends to em-
phasize what they have to do. So the choice of an epistemological 
pessimism – with regard to the possibility of neutral and objective 
knowledge of norms -, loses consistency, because it appears to be 
inextricably linked to an invitation to judges so that in the pursuit 
of their ‘conception of Justice’ they put rules aside as much as it’s 
necessary. I have no doubt that this idea is preceded by the best in-
tentions19 but necessarily interferes and diverts the research.
On the other hand, beyond the context surrounding the thesis, the 
broad notion that the author gives to the word ‘ideologies’ should 
include all of them, i.e. any that an interpreter could stick to, whe-
ther conservative or revolutionary, maybe liberal or authorita-
rian, etc. But then, what ideology would the activist judge have to 
adhere suggested as a model? Kennedy doesn’t seem to be willing 
to suggest support for those considered ‘predominant’ (conserva-
19  A legendary film by Ingmar Bergman (1992) had that title and showed how often our 
own behavior makes these ‘good intentions’ may be thwarted without one’s awareness. 
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tism and liberalism) and which ab initio he disqualifies. To make 
matters worse, according to his idea, it is not possible to predict the 
direction of the ideological impact on the solutions that are develo-
ped from the rules of the system20. These warnings complicate the 
support of this thesis even more.
4. Problematic consequences. Best intentions.
Finally, let me make some remarks regarding the practical conse-
quences of the thesis that we have considered. The scepticism des-
cribed can lead to a result not less harmful than the one it would 
apparently try to conjure21. If it is not possible to rely on that the 
rules of a legal system will have a significant impact on social dy-
namics and, above all, that mostly they will be followed loyally by 
the people responsible for applying then and developing solutions 
from the system for cases to be solved, the conclusion cannot be 
other than those people, at least implicitly, can actually leave the 
rules aside, depart from them and decide without affection to its 
objective sense, since this would be impossible to find after all.
If that epistemological perspective prevails, most likely there will be 
anomie in the system, encouraged by a conception that denies the 
laws capacity to govern people’s behavior. The next logical step will 
be the search of an authority that, no matter the norms issued, rules 
personally, as much in the name of God, of the collective spirit, of 
the soul of people, from the poor classes, or whatever; that is, the 
road to authoritarian or totalitarian ideas.
The early resignation to the objective of knowledge and neutrali-
ty in legal theory is equivalent to advocating that judges or others 
juridical operators hold themselves, not to objectively considered 
norms - since it would not be feasible to find their objective sen-
se- but to some of those force-ideas that could predominate in the 
culture and the society. The relatively recent history of 20th century 
20  Op. cit., pp. 47 and 102.
21  Apparently it would consist in changing the prevailing standards of interpretation to urge 
the interpretative transformation of certain rules -for example on property in the capitalist 
countries- to which a “huge and unfair impact on oppressed groups” is attributed (p. 101).
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shows many examples of disastrous consequences for societies and 
individuals, which can cause this type of approaches about what the 
judges do and in particular what they ‘have to do’ can cause.
The theory of law has debated for decade about its possible neutra-
lity, and the debate has not become extinct yet. Sometimes it is just 
delayed, left aside, or considered as an outdated issue, a piece for 
epistemology Museum. And sometimes, some author considered 
that the defense of political neutrality in the work of the legal phi-
losopher (unequivocal sign of a conservative ideology) can only 
avail itself (…) in a ignorant or elitist attitude22. This view, close to 
Kennedy’s conception, is not indeed uniform or prevailing. Bulygin 
observed that even if the law contains many ethical assessments, 
this is not a reason to deny the theory of law is – or should rather 
be – descriptive23.
In short, with different semantic or conceptual clothes, and diffe-
rent attitudes or beliefs, the problem continues today in the same 
way as when Hans Kelsen wrote the preface of the first edition of 
Pure Theory of Law in 1934, revealing the search of a remote or 
equidistant perspective regarding the influence of the political gales 
of the age24. What was discussed there could be said to be an episte-
mological problem. Undoubtedly it was. But it was also something 
22  Manuel Atienza, Current Argentine philosophy of law, Depalma, B. Aires, 1984, p. 232.
23  Eugenio Bulygin, in response to J. Raz in: A discussion on the theory of law, Marcial 
Pons, 2007, p. 109. In another text on the pure theory repeats that legal science consists 
in the description of positive law and not in their assessment “as it is a” matter of poli-
tics not science (in The problem of the validity in Kelsen, several studies under the title: 
Validity and effectiveness of the law, Astrea, 2005, p. 102)
24  After narrating the attacks the his theory had received from so different sectors (v. 
gr. Fascism and communism), he says that “if with everything” he dared “in those days” 
to show his work, it was “with the hope that a younger generation does not remain, in 
the wild uproar of our days, without believing in a free legal science [...]”. Almost two 
decades later, Bertrand Russel insisted in the fallibility of scientific theories which no 
sensible considers immutably perfect, and the consequences for ‘practical politics’ of 
such an intellectual attitude, especially tolerance; and urged to defend liberal beliefs, 
supported also by a democratic socialism, without shyly apologizing to dogmatism of left 
and right leanings, but deeply persuaded of the value of freedom, scientific indepen-
dence and mutual tolerance (in Philosophy and politics, part of the quoted Unpopular 
essays, chapter I, p. 28 et seq.).
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else Kelsen emphasized it instead of silencing it. The epistemolo-
gical question, as an issue that interests the theory of law, remains 
in the classrooms and academic campuses. But the practical conse-
quences of the problem go beyond these areas and are projected in 
the activity of the protagonists, the law operators, people of flesh 
and bone as Genaro Carrió used to say, and it also directly affects 
people’s life in general. Hence the practical interest of these issues.
Autor convidado.
